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NOTES AND COMMENTS
established pursuant to statute. A possible alternative theory might
have been based on a taking or partial confiscation of the plaintiffs'
property without just compensation with suit brought instead in the
U. S. Court of Claims.2
The North Carolina decision can be supported as a proper and just
one in view of both the historical development of the rights of land-
owners and the current interpretations and conclusions reached by
students of that "impenetrable jungle" of the law called nuisance.
ROBERT B. MILLMAN, JR.
Wills and Contracts-Degree of Mental Capacity Requisite for Each
The problem of whether the degree of mental capacity necessary
for making a valid will is in any way related to or measurable by that
degree of mental capacity requisite to entering into a valid contractual
obligation has been the source of frequent disagreement among courts.
In North Carolina, as in most jurisdictions, a person is in law deemed
to have sufficient mental capacity to make a will when he has a clear
understanding of the nature and extent of his act, the kind and value
of the property devised, the persons who are the natural objects of
his bounty, and the manner in which he desires to dispose of it.' The
problem is in determining when these requirements are met. Courts'
have repeatedly attempted to compare contractual capacity with testa-
mentary capacity, and for the most part the result has been unsatis-
factory.
It has been said that a lesser degree of mental capacity is required
for a will than for the execution of a valid contract or the transaction
of ordinary business.2 In an Illinois case,3 the testatrix had been ad-
judged incapable of managing her business affairs and a conservator
was appointed one month before the execution of her will. The court
held that this was not enough to invalidate a will,4 stating:
"Mental strength to compete with an antagonist and understand-
ing to protect his own interest are essential in the transaction of
ordinary business, while it is sufficient for the making of a will
that the testator understands the business in which he is en-
gaged, his property, the natural objects of his bounty, and the
disposition he desires to make of his property."5
11 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946); U. S. CONST.
amend. V.
'In re Will of Brown, 194 N. C. 583, 140 S. E. 192 (1927).
'Converse v. Converse, 2 Vt. 168 (1849).
'In re Weedman's Estate, 254 I1. 504, 98 N. E. 956 (1912).
'86 Ill. Rev. Stat. 14 (1874) provides that an inquest of lunacy once proven
will void subsequent contracts. It is significant that no such declaration is made
in regard to wills.
' In re Weedman's Estate. 254 Ill. 504. 508, 98 N. E. 956, 957 (1912). See also:
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It has also been held in Illinois that the mental capacity required for
making a will is less than that which is required for making a deed.0
A number of other courts have held that less mental faculty is re-
required for making a will than for executing any other instrument.
7
A recent Georgia case, holding that the capacity required to contract is
greater, declared: "The weak have the same rights as the strong to
dispose of their property by will, and anything less than a total absence
of mind will not destroy that capacity." s
North Carolina recognizes the same standard of mental capacity
for testing the validity of both deeds and wills, although it has been
suggested that, perhaps, the court would scrutinize a deed more closely.0
In an Alabama case1 0 the court held that the same degree of mental
capacity is required to make a will as is requisite to entering into a
valid contract, that there is no middle ground, and that both must stand
as to the question of capacity on precisely the same footing. A Mary-
land statute in its definition of testamentary capacity adds to the usual
"sound and disposing mind and memory" clause the requirement that
one must be capable of making a valid deed or contract."
A few courts seem to be of the opinion that the mental capacity
should be greater for making a will. In Aubert v. Augert' 2 a Louis-
iana court stated:
"Testaments are more easily avoided than contracts on the
ground of unsoundness of mind .... The difference has its source
in the consideration that laws regulating the capacity to con-
tract are in furtherance of the natural rights of man, and that
all restraints upon that capacity are abridgements of his liberty.
. . .Society cannot exist without the capacity to contract, but
the power to dispose of property by will is not necessary to its
well being."
King v. Lawless, 190 Ill. 520, 60 N. E. 881 (1901); Greene v. Maxwell, 251 IIl.
335, 6 N. E. 227, 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 418 (1911).
' Waugh v. Moan, 200 Ill. 298, 65 N. E. 713 (1902).
'I1t re Moyer's Will, 97 Misc. Rep. 512, 163 N. Y. S. 296 (Surr. Ct. 1916);
see also, It re Barney's Will, 187 Mich. 157, 153 N. W. 730 (1915), declaring
that it is elementary that less mental capacity is required to make a will than
to make a contract.
' Beman et al. v. Stembridge, 211 Ga. 274, 85 S. E. 2d 434, 440 (1955).
' Gilliken v. Norcom, 197 N. C. 8, 147 S. E. 433 (1929); In McDevitt v.
Chandler, 241 N. C. 677, 86 S. E. 2d 438 (1955) the court declared that in order
to execute a valid deed, the grantor must have sufficient mental capacity to under-
stand the nature and consequences of his act, what he is disposing of, and to whom.
"0 McElroy v. McElroy, 5 Ala. 81 (1843); see also Coleman v. Robertson's
Ex'rs., 17 Ala. 84 (1849), stating that the capacity to make a valid will or con-
tract is precisely the same.
" Applied in Lyon v. Townsend, 124 Md. 163, 91 A. 704 (1914); Davis v.
Calvert, 5 Gill & J. 269, 25 Am. Dec. 282 (1833).
"26 La. Ann. 104, 106 (1851).
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The logical inference from this divergence of judicial opinion is
that the two are so different in their nature that they cannot be com-
pared. This is the view which has been taken by the majority of the
courts. In determining the capacity of a person to execute a will,
attention should be given to the character of the instrument.'8 It
seems quite possible that one may lack the capacity to transact compli-
cated,14 important,' 5 or ordinary business' 6 and still be capable of mak-
ing a simple disposition of his property by will. Conversely, it would
seem than one may have contractual capacity and yet lack testamentary
capacity.'7 However, it is generally held that, in the absence of an
insane delusion, one who has contractual capacity has the capacity to
make a will.' 8
In Murphy v. Nett"9 the court refused to charge the jury that a
"less degree of mind" is required to execute a will than a contract,
saying:
".. . [W]e think in such matters comparisons are odious and
for purposes of instructing the jury wholly unnecessary. To
make a will implies more than merely signing it, and it con-
travenes human experience to say that the conception, ordering,
and comprehension of a will dispensing, with care and precision,
extensive property, involving, it may be, charities and trusts of
various kinds, requires less capacity than the purchase of a bar
of soap; or that the same intellectual capacity is required for the
simple holograph 'I leave all of my property to my wife' and for
the elaboration of a complex trade agreement designed to accom-
plish far reaching results. The conclusion of common sense is
that it takes more mind to make some wills than to make some
contracts, and vice versa. .... ,,20
A South Carolina decision,21 however, held that where testamentary
capacity was otherwise correctly defined and the court added that it
required less mental capacity to execute a will than a contract, it was
not sufficiently prejudicial to be reversible error.
"' In re Weber's Estate, 201 Mich. 447, 167 N. W. 937 (1918).
14 Barnhill v. Miller, 114 Kan. 73, 217 Pac. 274 (1923).
15 Neimes v. Neimes, 97 Ohio St 145, 119 N. E. 503 (1917).
' Mileham v. Montagne, 148 Iowa 476, 125 N. W. 664 (1910).
7American Bible Society v. Price, 115 Ill. 623, 5 N. E. 126 (1886).
" it re Wax's Estate, 106 Cal. 343, 39 Pac. 624 (1895).
10 47 Mont. 38, 57, 130 Pac. 451, 455 (1913).
0 See also: Turner's Appeal, 72 Conn. 305, 44 A. 310 (1899); Brown v.
Mitchell, 88 Tex. 350, 31 S. W. 621, 36 L. R. A. 64 (1895); Segur's Will, 71
Vt. 224, 44 A. 342 (1898) ; Greene v. Greene, 145 Ill. 264, 33 N. E. 941 (1893),
holding that while contractual capacity implies prima facie the capacity to make
a will, yet neither is a test for the other and the presence or absence of one does
not conclusively establish the presence or absence of the other.
" Goble v. Rauch, 50 S. C. 95, 27 S. E. 555 (1897).
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While the great weight of authority is against the comparison of
business capacity and testamentary capacity, the courts have by no
means been unanimous in so holding. It seems that some courts have
altered standards set by their own previous decisions. A Missouri
court once decided that a person may have testamentary capacity
even though he cannot transact complicated business, and in a later
case held that it was proper to instruct the jury that a person had
testamentary capacity if he had sufficient understanding to transact
business affairs.
LEwis H. PARHAM, JR.
"'Rose v. Rose, 249 S. W. 605 (Mo. 1923).
" Rex v. Masonic Home of Missouri, 341 Mo. 589, 108 S. W. 2d 897 (1937).
